The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards by Kimberly Ann Elliott
Although many deny it, a linkage be-
tween trade policy and labor standards
clearly exists.1 The International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO), long ignored and belittled,
is suddenly popular with various constitu-
ents who desperately want to deflect pres-
sure to incorporate labor standards in trade
agreements and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). As a result, the ILO today is get-
ting significantly more attention, more po-
litical support, and more resources to deal
with core labor standards, especially child
labor. In 1998, with strong support from the
United States, other developed country gov-
ernments, and key representatives of em-
ployers and workers, the ILO adopted a new
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. In 1999, the ILO approved a
new convention to combat the worst forms
of child labor, a convention that is being
ratified at the fastest rate in ILO history.
This year, for the first time, the ILO invoked
Article 33 of its constitution in an effort to
compel Burma to abolish forced labor.
The question, which many long-time
ILO observers answer skeptically, is
whether the increased attention can be
translated into sustained and more effec-
tive promotion of international labor stan-
dards. The answer ultimately depends on
whether the commitment to that goal is
more than skin-deep. Many developing-
country governments insist at WTO forums
that the ILO is the “competent body to set
and deal with labor standards,” but at the
same time they have resisted efforts to
strengthen its enforcement role. One might
also raise questions about the sincerity of
the United States, which has ratified only
two of the eight core ILO conventions.2 But
the United States willingly accepted in-
creased scrutiny with respect to the core
labor standards when it promoted the 1998
Declaration. It was also one of the first to
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The United States has ratified convention no.
105 on the abolition of forced labor and the new
convention, no. 182, on the worst forms of child
labor; the Clinton administration submitted no. 111
on nondiscrimination in employment for ratifica-
tion but the Senate has not acted; it has taken no
action to ratify convention no. 29 on the prohibi-
tion of forced labor, no. 87 or 98 on freedom of
association and collective bargaining; no. 138 set-
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has sharply increased its contribution to the ILO for
technical assistance to implement the Declaration
and to fund programs of the International Program
on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC).3
Thus far, those who want to strengthen the ILO
have garnered enough support to move ahead, in part,
by pointing to the importance of the institution’s cred-
ibility if the skeptics want to divert pressure on the
WTO to enforce labor standards. At its best, however,
the ILO alternative will not satisfy many of the crit-
ics of globalization. Moreover, proponents of incorpo-
rating labor standards in the WTO are correct that it
should address violations that are related to compe-
tition for export markets or foreign investment. Thus,
the WTO should clarify that Article 20(e) applies to all
forms of forced labor, not just prison labor, and it should
examine the enforcement of labor standards in ex-
port processing zones. But the ILO is the competent
body to set and enforce labor standards in general and
it should be given the support necessary to do the job.
The ILO’s Tools
Whether at the local or international level, en-
forcement of law, standards, and norms relies on three
basic tools—sunshine, carrots, and sticks. The ILO
has traditionally relied primarily on sunshine,
through its elaborate supervisory mechanisms, and
carrots in the form of technical assistance. Until the
Burma forced-labor case, the use of sticks was lim-
ited primarily to peer pressure. In recent years, the
ILO has moved to strengthen all three of these tools.
Sunshine and the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles
The ILO has extensive mechanisms for super-
vising the application of conventions, including both
a routine reporting-and-review process and ad hoc
procedures for handling complaints by worker or em-
ployer groups or governments regarding another
member’s compliance. Article 22 of the ILO constitu-
tion requires member governments to report rou-
tinely on conventions they have ratified, while Ar-
ticle 19 may be invoked to request periodic reports
from members explaining why they have not ratified
a particular convention and describing what they are
doing under their national laws to achieve the goals
of the convention.
The Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) reviews
both types of reports each year and prepares its own
report, noting cases of progress as well as problems
in implementation. The CEACR may also choose to
address a potential problem by submitting a “direct
request” for additional information to a member gov-
ernment. Another layer of supervision and peer pres-
sure is added at the annual International Labor Con-
ference when the Conference Committee on the Ap-
plication of Conventions and Recommendations
meets to review the CEACR report. In addition to a
general discussion, the Conference Committee dis-
cusses individual cases and invites governments to
explain problems in applying ratified conventions. Its
report may include references to cases of special con-
cern, including “continued failure to implement.”
In addition to these reporting requirements, any
worker or employer organization, not just those for-
mally appointed as delegates to the ILO, can make
representations under Article 24 of the ILO consti-
tution when they feel a member government is not
complying with a convention it has ratified. Because
it is regarded as a fundamental constitutional obli-
gation of all members, however, complaints regard-
ing violations of freedom of association may be
brought against any member government, regardless
of convention ratification status, and referred to the
Committee on Freedom of Association for review.
One problem with all this sunshine, however, is
that the sheer volume of information—and the lack
of attention to organizing it in user-friendly fashion—
can overwhelm potential users and make the orga-
nization less rather than more transparent. There
have been efforts to streamline reporting require-
ments, but, as more countries have joined and more
conventions have been adopted, the total number of
routine reports required has risen from an annual
average of just over 600 in the 1930s to 2,036 in 1998,
and the proportion submitted in timely fashion has
fallen from roughly 85 percent to 71 percent in 1998.
On the other hand, until recently, only countries that
ratified conventions were required to report routinely
on implementation.
In 1998, however, the International Labor Con-
ference approved a Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work with a follow-up mecha-
nism that seeks to fill some of the gaps and to focus
attention on the four internationally recognized core
principles:
• freedom of association and the “effective rec-
ognition of the right to collective bargaining”;
• freedom from forced labor;
• the “effective abolition of child labor”; and
• nondiscrimination in employment.
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The Clinton administration increased its contribution to IPEC
ten-fold in 1999 and proposed increasing it another 50 per-
cent for fiscal 2001, to $45 million. Congress approved the
administration’s request for $20 million in fiscal 2000 for the
ILO’s program of technical assistance to improve enforcement
of core labor standards, up from $0, and is expected to approve
the same amount for fiscal 2001. ILO Focus 13, no. 1, 2000
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The follow-up mechanism requires all member
countries who have not ratified one or more of the
eight conventions associated with these rights to
report annually on what they are doing to promote
the principles involved, though not the more detailed
legal obligations in the conventions. Employer and
worker groups are invited to provide comments on
the submissions and a group of independent expert-
advisers then examines the reports and writes an
introduction to the compilation of national reports.
In addition, the director-general is to prepare an an-
nual global report on each one of the four principles
in turn to highlight overall trends in respect for the
core principles. The first global report, released in
May, focused on freedom of association; the next re-
port, in 2001, will focus on forced labor.
The initial results from this new mechanism are
mixed. While only a little over 50 percent of the re-
quired country reports were received in time to be
reviewed by the committee of expert-advisers, that
figure probably exaggerates the degree of willful non-
compliance. The laggards, who are clearly identified
in a table in the experts’ introduction, are overwhelm-
ingly countries with the fewest resources, those in-
volved in internal conflicts, or those lacking a func-
tioning central government. Among the reports sub-
mitted, however, the experts noted that many are
inadequate to provide a baseline against which
progress can be measured, as was intended, and they
lamented the fact that so few employer and worker
groups chose to comment on the reports. Overall, the
experts’ introduction to the compilation of country
reports was clearly written, frank in identifying weak-
nesses in the reporting process, and provided useful
suggestions for improving it.4 In future reports, how-
ever, they should go further in identifying those coun-
tries whose reports are inadequate or where particu-
lar problems are evident.
Potentially more useful for those trying to discern
the overall status of core labor standards around the
world is the director-general’s global report. Unfortu-
nately, this idea was opposed by some important de-
veloping country delegates during the debate on the
1998 Declaration and several of them abstained from
the vote, nearly denying it the quorum needed to gain
approval. When the first global report was discussed
at the June 2000 International Labor Conference,
many of the same countries criticized Director-Gen-
eral Juan Somavia for “naming names,” including
pointing to “manifest violations” of freedom of asso-
ciation in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emir-
ates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Equatorial Guinea, where
worker organizations are either prohibited or so re-
stricted as to be meaningless.5 The report also high-
lights the “more frequent denial of the right to orga-
nize” that occurs with “legislatively imposed monopo-
lies,” such as those in China, Cuba, Iraq, Sudan,
Syria, and Vietnam. To his credit, Somavia rejected
the criticism and noted that “it is difficult to see how
the Office can do credible reporting unless countries
are identified and facts are stated.”6
A more valid criticism of the report, echoed by
employer and worker delegates alike, was that it did
not adequately distinguish fundamental violations
of freedom of association from more detailed legal
obligations, such as the treatment of public-sector
workers. Going beyond naming names to more clearly
prioritizing violations or to putting countries in cat-
egories by degree of violation is politically sensitive
and unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. The
information is in the various ILO reports, however,
and it would be useful for some external group to com-
pile such an assessment. Enforcement of core labor
standards is probably too complex to capture in a
simple ranking like the Transparency International
“perceptions of corruption index,” but it should be pos-
sible to assign countries to broad categories. In or-
der to capture the dynamic nature of standards en-
forcement, such an assessment should reflect, not
just the current level of enforcement, but whether
the country is moving forward, backward, or stand-
ing still. If it is moving backward or standing still,
the assessment should also indicate whether the
lack of progress is due to government policy or to lack
of capacity.
Another issue that should be addressed as the
process evolves is the 4-year reporting cycle. Once
the first cycle of reports is completed and a baseline
picture drawn, it would be useful to shift to an an-
nual report that sums up the progress made in all
four areas over the previous year. Perhaps the re-
port could retain the rotating focus on one core area,
but then update in an appendix what has been ac-















4 All the reports under the follow-up mechanism are available
on the ILO Web site at http://www.ilo.org.
5 The Gulf countries protested being singled out in the report
and, privately, some ILO officials concede there should have
been more context in the report. The Gulf countries are in an
unusual position with respect to freedom of association be-
cause of the high proportion of foreigners in the workforce;
but they recognize the problem and have asked the ILO to
increase technical cooperation to address it.
6 Reply by the Director-General to the Discussion of his
Report, Provisional Record 25, International Labor Confer-
ence, 88th Session, Geneva, 2000.areas. An annual update would both make the report
more useful to outside observers and assist the gov-
erning body in identifying future priorities.
Carrots
In addition to increasing transparency, another
objective of the follow-up to the Declaration is to iden-
tify priorities for technical assistance. The most ef-
fective and sustainable means of improving imple-
mentation of core labor standards is to provide tech-
nical and financial assistance to countries that want
to improve enforcement but lack the resources to do
it. The final phase of the Declaration follow-up cycle
each year is a report to the governing body in Novem-
ber identifying the technical assistance priorities that
derive from the various reports. The Declaration and
its follow-up have already attracted increased finan-
cial contributions from developed country members
who are interested in ensuring its effectiveness.
There are also other manifestations of a trade-labor
standards linkage in the ILO’s regular technical co-
operation program, including three recent programs
that are particularly interesting.
Two of these cases involve child labor in South
Asia and derive from cooperative agreements involv-
ing the ILO, the governments of Pakistan and
Bangladesh, respectively, the business community,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other
international organizations, such as UNICEF. The first
case arose when Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) intro-
duced legislation in the US Congress to ban imports
of products made with child labor. Though the bill
never passed, Bangladeshi garment manufacturers
perceived a threat to their exports and fired tens of
thousands of children from their factories. Fearing
for the future of the children, the ILO and UNICEF
negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MoU)
with the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers’ Asso-
ciation providing that all children working in the sec-
tor would be removed, but not until schools were avail-
able for them. The parties also agreed on joint fund-
ing and a monitoring plan to be overseen by the ILO.
Since the MoU was signed in 1995, 353 schools have
been created and the incidence of child labor in
Bangladesh garment factories has dropped dramati-
cally.7
The second case involves the soccer ball indus-
try in Pakistan, which came under pressure to elimi-
nate child labor after human rights activists revealed
the problem and began pressuring major marketers
of soccer balls, including Nike and adidas, to take
action. The memorandum of understanding that re-
sulted in February 1997 was modeled on the
Bangladesh agreement and was signed by represen-
tatives of soccer ball manufacturers, US importers,
the Sialkot (Pakistan) Chamber of Commerce, and
various NGOs, as well as the ILO and UNICEF. Be-
cause much of the stitching of soccer balls was done
at home, a key part of the agreement was to estab-
lish stitching centers that could be more easily moni-
tored. Like the Bangladesh agreement, the Sialkot
MoU also provides for education, training, and other
rehabilitative services for the children previously
employed in stitching soccer balls and tasks the ILO
with monitoring the agreement. In the first 18
months of the agreement, manufacturers account-
ing for nearly 70 percent of Sialkot’s production of
soccer balls were participating, roughly half their pro-
duction had been transferred to stitching centers,
and 5,400 children were enrolled in the “village edu-
cation and action centers” created by the program.8
The third ILO program evolved out of a bilateral
textile agreement negotiated between Cambodia and
the United States in 1998. US negotiators offered to
expand the size of Cambodia’s export quota by 14 per-
cent if “working conditions in the Cambodia textile
and apparel sector substantially comply with” local
law and internationally recognized core standards.
In the first review in December 1999, US officials
concluded that substantial compliance had not been
achieved but, in recognition of the progress that had
been made, it offered a 5 percent quota increase to
be implemented when Cambodia completed an agree-
ment with the ILO to establish an independent moni-
toring program. Some ILO officials were initially
leery, fearing that external monitoring would further
weaken existing local capacity. The ILO agreed to
the plan only after gaining a commitment from US
officials to provide $500,000 for a parallel program to
provide technical assistance and training to the Cam-
bodian labor ministry. The United States is also pro-
viding $1 million of the $1.4 million cost of the 3-
year monitoring program, with the Cambodian gov-
ernment and the Garment Manufacturers’ Associa-
tion splitting the balance (US Trade Representative
press release, 18 May 2000).
Sticks
In addition to routine reporting and review of com-
pliance and the spotlight of the new Declaration on
Fundamental Principles, the ILO provides multiple
avenues for worker, employer, and government rep-
resentatives to raise issues of alleged noncompli-
ance. Article 26 of the constitution is the provision
reserved for the most serious cases and complaints,
July 2000 4 00-6
7 US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Af-
fairs, By the Sweat and Toil of Children: Efforts to Eliminate Child
Labor 5, Washington, 1998, p. 89.
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	and unlike Article 24 representations, may be made
only by official ILO delegates.
After a complaint is made, the ILO governing body
tries to resolve it by seeking the member’s permis-
sion to send a Direct Contacts Mission to discuss the
problem. If that is not sufficient, a Commission of
Inquiry may be appointed to investigate the charges.
The commission will report its findings and, if appro-
priate, make recommendations as to how the mem-
ber can make its laws and practices consistent with
the relevant convention. The target of the complaint
is given the opportunity to appeal to the International
Court of Justice. If the commission’s findings are not
appealed or are upheld, the country will be asked to
report on what it has done to implement the
commission’s recommendations.
Up to this point, Article 26 procedures are simi-
lar to those often proposed for a WTO social clause
and many people believed that the similarities end
here, with the ILO having no enforcement power. Until
recently, that would not have been a bad assumption
because the provision in the ILO constitution autho-
rizing action to compel compliance had never been
invoked. Nevertheless, Article 33 provides that, if
satisfactory compliance is not forthcoming, “the gov-
erning body may recommend to the conference such
action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure
compliance therewith.”9
Until 1946, Article 33 looked even more like a
social clause, explicitly providing that members could
take “measures of an economic character” against
another member refusing to come into compliance
with the recommendations of a Commission of In-
quiry.10 A constitutional review undertaken after
World War II broadened Article 33 to “leave it to the
governing body’s discretion to adapt its action to the
circumstances of the particular case,” but the
amended language does not exclude the possibility of
economic, or any other, sanctions.11
The Evolution of ILO Enforcement
In 1919, when the ILO was created, the Commis-
sion on International Labor Legislation observed that
Article 26 had “been carefully devised in order to avoid
the imposition of penalties, except in the last resort,
when a State has flagrantly and persistently refused
to carry out its obligations under a convention. It can
hardly be doubted that it will seldom, if ever, be nec-
essary to bring these powers into operation.”12 In-
deed, between 1919 and 1960, there was only one
Article 26 complaint and in the following 40 years an
average of only six complaints per decade was re-
ceived. In all, only six Commissions of Inquiry have
been appointed.13 None of these commission reports
were appealed to the International Court of Justice
and, although implementation of the commissions’
recommendations appears to have been mixed, the
application of Article 33 was never raised—until this
year.14
The problem of forced labor in Burma is long
standing but, according to the Commission of Inquiry
report, it accelerated after a military junta seized
power in 1988 and especially in the early 1990s when
the regime undertook a massive infrastructure-
building campaign as part of an effort to attract tour-
ists and foreign investment. In 1996, a number of
worker delegates filed an Article 26 complaint re-
garding forced labor in Burma and a Commission of
Inquiry was appointed in March 1997. The commis-
sion completed its report in July 1998 and called on
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9 International Labor Office, Measures, including action un-
der article 33 of the Constitution…to secure compliance by the
Government of Myanmar…, GB.276/6, 276th Session of the
Governing Body, Geneva, November 1999.
10 International Labor Office, Reports I and II and Constitutional
Questions, 29th Session of the International Labor Conference,
1946.
11 Ibid. See also International Labor Office, Measures, includ-
ing action under article 33 of the Constitution…to secure com-
pliance by the Government of Myanmar…, GB.276/6, 276th
Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, November 1999. Some
argue that a reference to the UN Security Council in the 1946
constitutional review report should be interpreted as reserv-
ing to that body the power to impose economic sanctions. It is
not clear, however, that this interpretation is consistent ei-
ther with the plain language of Article 33 or with that period’s
much narrower interpretation of UN jurisdiction and much
broader interpretation of national sovereignty.
12 Quoted in ibid., p. 4.
13 See International Labor Standards: How Are They Enforced? on
the ILO Web site http://www.ilo.org.
14 One assessment finds that most governments have accepted
the findings of commission reports. Poland, however, refused
to cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry appointed to in-
vestigate a freedom of association complaint raised in the early
1980s when the government was trying to break the Solidar-
ity union movement. Germany also rejected the finding by a
commission that it unfairly discriminated against public em-
ployees for political reasons. In other cases, governments
nominally accepted the conclusions of a commission but re-
medial actions often have been inadequate. See Cesare P.R.
Romano, The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Con-
trol: A Review and Lessons for Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, E-96-1, International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, May 1996. The Washing-
ton Office of the ILO has also commissioned a report to exam-
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the Government of Burma to bring its laws and prac-
tice into compliance with Convention No. 29 by May
1999. In the absence of a constructive response from
Burma, the June 1999 International Labor Confer-
ence approved a resolution that condemned its re-
fusal to comply with the commission’s recommenda-
tions, prohibited technical assistance, except as
might be necessary to implement the recommenda-
tions, and banned Burma from most meetings, the
first such action in ILO history. It also requested that
the governing body consider whether further action
under Article 33 might be justified.
Even this modest penalty attracted opposition from
some members.15 Cuba, seconded by Mexico, Colom-
bia, and Venezuela, offered a motion to separate the
part of the resolution condemning Burma’s noncom-
pliance from the portion imposing penalties. The
motion was defeated by voice vote when representa-
tives of the employer and worker groups, joined by
government members from the United States and
United Kingdom, indicated their opposition thereby
ensuring that it would not receive the necessary two-
thirds approval.16
In March 2000, the governing body invoked Ar-
ticle 33 for the first time in the ILO’s history and rec-
ommended that the June 2000 International Labor
Conference take further action against Burma be-
cause of its failure to comply. The decision, approved
without a vote, suggests a variety of actions that the
International Labor Conference might take, includ-
ing calling on member states “to review their rela-
tionship with the Government of Myanmar [Burma]
and to take appropriate measures to ensure that
Myanmar ‘cannot take advantage of such relations
to perpetuate or extend the system of forced or com-
pulsory labor…’.” Possible actions also include call-
ing on other international organizations to consider
whether any of their activities “could have the effect
of directly or indirectly abetting the practice of forced
or compulsory labor.”
In May, the regime in Burma, which had repeat-
edly denied that forced labor occurred and refused to
cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry, suddenly
reversed course and invited the ILO to send a tech-
nical mission to discuss resolution of the problem.
While the regime admitted that forced labor might
have been a problem in the past, they insisted that it
no longer was and that Article 33 action was unnec-
essary. Though the technical mission praised the
openness and cooperation they received from officials
in Burma, they noted that no concrete action had
been taken to implement the commission’s recom-
mendations. On May 27, just before the Conference
opened, the labor minister of Burma sent a letter to
the director-general, claiming that they had taken
steps against forced labor, were willing to “take into
consideration appropriate measures…to ensure the
prevention of such occurrences in the future,” and
wanted to continue the dialogue begun by the tech-
nical mission.17
Burma’s neighbors in East Asia seized on the ap-
parent concessions and took the lead in arguing at
the Conference that the decision on Article 33 ac-
tion should be delayed until the following year when
Burma’s actions could again be evaluated. The work-
ers’ group argued for immediate implementation of
the actions proposed in the resolution forwarded to
the Conference by the governing body in March. They
ultimately agreed, however, to an employer group
compromise that called for Conference approval of
the proposed measures against Burma, but a delay
in implementation to test Burma’s pledge to take ac-
tion. This version of the resolution, which passed
257 to 41 (with 31 abstentions), sets November 30,
2000, as the date the resolution will take effect un-
less the governing body determines that Burma has
take sufficient and concrete actions to comply with
the Commission of Inquiry’s recommendations.
Some observers complain that the resolution
underscores the weakness of the ILO because it does
not directly impose sanctions against Burma but calls
on member governments and other UN organizations
to take appropriate action. But this view ignores the
fact that the WTO also authorizes member govern-
ments to take action to remedy violations but does
not directly impose them itself. The ILO’s response
is not very different from the WTO approach in that
it leaves it to relevant member governments to de-
termine, within prescribed limits, the cost of enforce-
ment they are willing to bear.
Are the WTO’s Teeth Really Sharper?
The constitutional review undertaken by the ILO
in 1946 was triggered by the need to adapt to the UN
system and the expected expansion of its member-
ship to include former colonies and less developed












15 At the time of the resolution, Burma was not receiving any
technical assistance and had received a total of just $1.5 mil-
lion from 1991-96. The ban on meetings is also more about
symbolism than substance since no member can be barred from
constitutionally authorized governing body and International
Labor Conference meetings.
16 ILO Focus 12, no. 2, Summer/Fall 1999, Washington Branch
Office of the ILO, p. 1
17 Report of the ILO Technical Cooperation Mission to Myanmar,
Provisional Record 8, International Labor Conference, 88th
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countries. In this context, the report accompanying
the recommendations for amendment of the consti-
tution recognized both the limitations of sanctions
and the importance of a genuine commitment to
change on the part of key domestic actors. The re-
port argues
that the problem is primarily one of national
standards of law enforcement and that inter-
national action should therefore be directed
towards promoting the progressive develop-
ment of more effective national administra-
tive machinery….
What is not often recognized by critics of the ILO’s
lack of teeth is that international enforcement of
national regulations is a far cry from enforcement of
international bargains to liberalize foreign market
access. This is a lesson that the WTO is also learn-
ing as it extends its reach well beyond national bor-
ders.
Industry representatives pushed aggressively to
move protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs)
from the World Intellectual Property Organization to
the WTO because “the WTO has teeth.” But while
countries have largely complied with the letter of the
new rules, effective enforcement of domestic IPR laws
lags and will remain a problem where the will and
capacity to enforce them is lacking. Studies of inter-
national financial institutions’ efforts to condition
their loans on far-reaching internal reforms also con-
clude that such conditionality is seldom effective
unless the country is receptive to reforms and is seek-
ing external assistance to implement them.
Extensive research on foreign policy and commer-
cial trade sanctions also underscores the limited util-
18 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Elliott, Eco-
nomic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3 rd edition, forthcoming 2001,
and Thomas O. Bayard and Elliott, 1994, Reciprocity and Re-
taliation in US Trade Policy, both published by the Institute for
International Economics.
ity of economic sanctions in areas of political sensi-
tivity or where compliance is difficult to define or
measure.18 Even adverse rulings by a WTO dispute
settlement panel and subsequent trade retaliation
by the United States have been insufficient to force
European Union compliance in two politically sensi-
tive cases involving agriculture and former colonial
relationships. Arm-twisting simply has limited util-
ity in these situations.
Thus, experience in a variety of areas suggests
the ILO is right to focus on positive efforts to work
with countries to improve enforcement of labor stan-
dards. But it also has the constitutional authority to
respond to egregious violations when necessary and
has now shown that it can do so. The real test of ILO
credibility, however, will come over time as we see
whether Burma is a precedent or an aberration. It is
a small, poor, relatively isolated country and the vio-
lations were both egregious and well documented.
Other cases will not be so easy. Moreover, credibility
depends on balancing the need to show that the ILO
is willing to confront larger and more powerful mem-
bers with a pragmatic concern for the limits of ILO
leverage and the costs of picking fights it knows it
cannot win. Striking this balance will require con-
tinued creativity and innovation similar to what went
into the development of the Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles, the technical cooperation pro-
grams in South Asia and Cambodia, and the Article
33 resolution sanctioning Burma.
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